Assessment of OCR Quality and Font Identification in Historical Documents

Mass digitization of historical documents is a challenging problem for optical character recognition (OCR) tools. Issues include noisy backgrounds and faded text due to aging, border/marginal noise, bleed-through, skewing, warping, as well as irregular fonts and page layouts. As a result, OCR tools often produce a large number of spurious bounding boxes (BBs) in addition to those that correspond to words in the document. To improve the OCR output, in this thesis we develop machine-learning methods to assess the quality of historical documents and label/tag documents (with the page problems) in the EEBO/ECCO collections—45 million pages available through the Early Modern OCR Project at Texas A&M University. We present an iterative classification algorithm to automatically label BBs (i.e., as text or noise) based on their spatial distribution and geometry. The approach uses a rule-base classifier to generate initial text/noise labels for each BB, followed by an iterative classifier that refines the initial labels by incorporating local information to each BB, its spatial location, shape and size. When evaluated on a dataset containing over 72,000 manually-labeled BBs from 159 historical documents, the algorithm can classify BBs with 0.95 precision and 0.96 recall. Further evaluation on a collection of 6,775 documents with ground-truth transcriptions shows that the algorithm can also be used to predict document quality (0.7 correlation) and improve OCR transcriptions in 85% of the cases. This thesis also aims at generating font metadata for historical documents. Knowledge of the font can aid OCR system to produce very accurate text transcriptions, but getting font information for 45 million documents is a daunting task. We present an active learning based font identification system that can classify document images into fonts. In active learning, a learner queries the human for labels on examples it finds most informative. We capture the characteristics of the fonts using word image features related to character width, angled strokes, and Zernike moments. To extract page level features, we use bag-of-word feature (BoF) model. A font classification model trained using BoF and active learning requires only 443 labeled instances to achieve 89.3% test accuracy

Toward More Scalable Off-Line Simulations of MPI Applications

International audienceThe off-line (or post-mortem) analysis of execution event traces is a popular approach to understand the performance of HPC applications that use the message passing paradigm. Combining this analysis with simulation makes it possible to " replay " the application execution to explore " what if? " scenarios, e.g., assessing application performance in a range of (hypothetical) execution environments. However, such off-line analysis faces scalability issues for acquiring, storing, or replaying large event traces. We first present two previously proposed and complementary frameworks for off-line replaying of MPI application event traces, each with its own objectives and limitations. We then describe how these frameworks can be combined so as to capitalize on their respective strengths while alleviating several of their limitations. We claim that the combined framework affords levels of scalability that are beyond that achievable by either one of the two individual frameworks. We evaluate this framework to illustrate the benefits of the proposed combination for a more scalable off-line analysis of MPI applications

Incentive Stackelberg Mean-payoff Games

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive and leader equilibria, there is a distinguished player called the leader who can assign strategies to all other players, referred to as her followers. A strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the leader, can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally, and a leader equilibrium is a leader strategy profile with a maximal return for the leader. In the proposed case of incentive equilibria, the leader can additionally influence the behaviour of her followers by transferring parts of her payoff to her followers. The ability to incentivise her followers provides the leader with more freedom in selecting strategy profiles, and we show that this can indeed improve the payoff for the leader in such games. The key fundamental result of the paper is the existence of incentive equilibria in mean-payoff games. We further show that the decision problem related to constructing incentive equilibria is NP-complete. On a positive note, we show that, when the number of players is fixed, the complexity of the problem falls in the same class as two-player mean-payoff games. We also present an implementation of the proposed algorithms, and discuss experimental results that demonstrate the feasibility of the analysis of medium sized games.Comment: 15 pages, references, appendix, 5 figure